**New Flow for Submission**

Intro

* I argue that dictators must prioritize, cannot multitask
* Possible to know their priorities by looking at post-election responses to local defeats
* Use Vietnam as a case study
  + Take advantage of rare, unexpected defeats in a carefully managed elections
    - Elections that the dictators did not have to lose and did not want to lose but did not do everything it could possibly do and still allow defeat to happen
  + Plausible exogeneity by looking at close elections
    - Look at over time changes
    - Combining three different approaches: fixed effects model, regression discontinuity, generalized synthetic control to address all possible concerns
* Contribute by demonstrating how not all theories can apply to one case, and how to identify which theory work in such a case
* Confirm the mechanism through a set of additional analyses

Limited power of authoritarian elections

* Informational value of elections
* Why dictators cannot multitask with elections
  + Harder to manipulate i.e. information requires not over-managing elections
  + Confusing info i.e. too much under-managing elections hurt too!
  + Harder to decide which action to take
* In the case of Vietnam, CPV needs information and can use elections
  + Govt needs but does not have info on A
  + Govt needs but does not have info on B
  + But if it indeed cannot multitask, then only one information is being collected!
* Govt can use elections but not clear for what
  + Elections in Vietnam
    - Background
  + On surface, equally plausible that it is used to collect both types of info
    - Plausible that it is used to shed light on A
    - Plausible that it is used to shed light on B
  + Thus need to look at post-election responses to discern

How local defeats can shed light

* Possible to use local defeats to learn what information is being prioritized
  + Local defeats are high information event
  + Link from post-election responses to intention
* Local defeats in Vietnam elections
  + Treatment assignment overview:
    - Who gets defeated, how rare
    - provinces with vs without defeats

Empirical strategies

* Combine three models
* Confirming no manipulation
* Confirming mechanism: increases in development expenditure
* Confirming that no other punishment is happening
* Confirming that no effect from representation